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Able Danger
Topic Started: Aug 11 2005, 06:50 AM (174 Views)
Hoss
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Don't make me use my bare hands on you.
Can't believe that no one is talking about this here. I haven't been around much this week, but anyway..

http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,165268,00.html

Quote:
 
Hamilton's remarks Tuesday followed findings by Rep. Curt Weldon (search), R-Pa., vice chairman of the House Armed Services and Homeland Security committees, that made front-page news.

In June, Weldon displayed charts on the floor of the U.S. Senate showing that Able Danger identified the suspected terrorists in 1999. The unit repeatedly asked for the information to be forwarded to the FBI but apparently to no avail.
Quote:
 
Weldon said that in September 2000, the unit recommended on three separate occasions that its information on the hijackers be given to the FBI "so they could bring that cell in and take out the terrorists." However, Weldon said Pentagon lawyers rejected the recommendation, arguing that Atta and the others were in the country legally so information on them could not be shared with law enforcement.

"Lawyers within the administration — and we're talking about the Clinton administration, not the Bush administration — said 'you can't do it,'" and put post-its over Atta's face, Weldon said. "They said they were concerned about the political fallout that occurred after Waco ... and the Branch Davidians."


I knew that the basic problem was lack of interdepartment communication within the government, but this is surprising. The military actually wanted to share info. with the FBI, but were stopped by lawyers who were afraid of political ramifications?
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Admiralbill_gomec
UberAdmiral
I had heard about it.

All I can say is, "Thank you Jamie Gorelick."
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24thcenstfan
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Something Wicked This Fae Comes
I think if what the DoD is claiming is true, that this is another indicator of how much our Intel services, and the political climate in general that delt with the Intel agencies, had broken down before 9/11.

I think there is still a lot left to come out about this story. The disbanded 9/11 Commission is checking their notes in the archives to see if Able Danger was mentioned. Also, there is the matter of whether or not Atta and others name were even mentioned at all.

Most importantly, if the DoD is being entirely truthful about their attempts and/or their interpretation of events that led to the FBI not being delivered the information.

There is the matter of who tried to block the information. At one point it is mentioned that "Pentagon lawyers" blocked the information, and another point is made that "Administration lawyers" blocked the information.

I think that can mean something entirely different. If lawyers at the Pentagon blocked the information, then that is not the same as saying "Administration lawyers" blocked the information. The latter implies the President knew what was going on (or was at fault). The former implies that the DoD was at fault.

Regardless, somebody has some serious explaining to do. I also don't think this (Able Danger) will be the last of the surprises to come out from this new investigation.
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ImpulseEngine
Admiral
I'm waiting to hear more about this before I form more of an opinion.

First, I do think hindsight is 20-20. Our perspective about terrorism was greatly different before 9/11. That defense is so often used to justify the inaction of the Bush administration with respect to their hearing about the possibility of an airplane being used as a weapon shortly before 9/11. If we're going to allow the Bush defense, then the same defense should apply here too for the Clinton administration. (Or, conversely, they're both at fault for dropping the ball.)

That said, a known terror cell should be taken out. Maybe our policy did not allow for sharing information with the FBI at that time, but I would like to know what, if any, other action was taken to act upon this knowledge. I would find it inexcusable that the information was simply put aside and nothing at all done with it. Then would come the question of exactly who was responsible for leaving the matter unresolved.
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Dandandat
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Time to put something here
ImpulseEngine
Aug 11 2005, 11:18 AM
First, I do think hindsight is 20-20. Our perspective about terrorism was greatly different before 9/11. That defense is so often used to justify the inaction of the Bush administration with respect to their hearing about the possibility of an airplane being used as a weapon shortly before 9/11. If we're going to allow the Bush defense, then the same defense should apply here too for the Clinton administration. (Or, conversely, they're both at fault for dropping the ball.)

I agree, I believe this is just another example of how we where all to complacent before 9/11 and that it was so many peoples fault that is useless to go around blaming people, what has to be done form this point is fix the problem. I just wonder if all those people who like to go on and on about how Bush is to blame for 9/11 also now add Clinton into that condemnation.
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Wichita
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The Adminstrator wRench
This report highlights the problem with having Jamie Gorelick on the panel. There is nothing inherently wrong with her nor with the fact that she was a high ranking Clinton Administration official.

The problem was she was a high ranking official who wrote the policy that affected the sharing of intel. How can you adequately investigate the problems with intel if you assume from the beginning that one part of the procedure is above investigation? How can you investigate that procedure if you assume from the beginning that there was no way it contributed to the problem?

IMO it was quite possible that, after an adequate investigation of Gorelick's role in the issue, the commission may have come to the conclusion that it played no role in the issue. NOT INVESTIGATING it, however, calls into question the integrity of the whole report.

Now, Commission members are saying that they did hear this information - why they did nothing in response calls into greater question their report.

IE, I agree that the mindset of the time was entirely different and that neither Clinton and Bush should not have been expected to believe random reports of this possibility.

That is very different, however, from the issue of this particular set of administrative procedures. It is quite possible that this set of administrative procedures made it impossible (with the force of law) to share information. If they were formulated by the Clinton Administration, then they should be the responsibility of the Clinton Administration - just as administrative procedures formulated by the Bush administration should be the responsibility of the Bush administration.

Thousands of these types of regulations are passed yearly with little input from the public, but have the potential to impact the public greatly. It is a serious concern, but seldom gets publicly.

This particular decision by Gorelick was incredibly harmful and stupid IMO and while I don't think it rises to the criminal level, I find it offensive that she didn't even have to answer questions about it because of her position on the Commission.

BTW, this whole question is now being linked to the Sandy Berger situation. People have wondered why he would do what he did ,,, this may be why. We'll have to see ...
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Admiralbill_gomec
UberAdmiral
This will make your head explode:

http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/national/A...artner=homepage

Titled: Atta Details Omitted From Sept. 11 Report

Quote:
 
The Sept. 11 commission knew military intelligence officials had identified lead hijacker Mohamed Atta as a member of al-Qaida who might be part of U.S.-based terror cell more than a year before the terror attacks but decided not to include that in its final report, a spokesman acknowledged Thursday.

Al Felzenberg, spokesman for the commission's follow-up project called the 9/11 Public Discourse Project, had said earlier this week that the panel was unaware of intelligence specifically naming Atta. But he said subsequent information provided Wednesday confirmed that the commission had been aware of the intelligence.

The information did not make it into the final report because it was not consistent with what the commission knew about Atta's whereabouts before the attacks, Felzenberg said.

The intelligence about Atta recently was disclosed by Rep. Curt Weldon, vice chairman of the House Armed Services and Homeland Security committees. The Pennsylvania Republican has expressed anger that the intelligence never was forwarded by the military establishment to the FBI.

The discourse project, Pentagon and at least two congressional committees are looking into the issue. If found accurate, the intelligence would change the timeline for when government officials first became aware of Atta's links to al-Qaida.

According to Weldon, a classified military intelligence unit called ''Able Danger'' identified Atta and three other hijackers in 1999 as potential members of a terrorist cell in New York City. Weldon said Pentagon lawyers rejected the unit's recommendation that the information be turned over to the FBI in 2000.

According to Pentagon documents, the information was not shared because of concerns about pursuing information on ''U.S. persons,'' a legal term that includes U.S. citizens as well as foreigners legally admitted to the country.

Felzenberg said an unidentified person working with Weldon came forward Wednesday and described a meeting 10 days before the panel's report was issued last July. During it, a military official urged commission staffers to include a reference to the intelligence on Atta in the final report.

Felzenberg said checks were made and the details of the July 12, 2004, meeting were confirmed. Previous to that, Felzenberg said it was believed commission staffers knew about Able Danger from a meeting with military officials in Afghanistan during which no mention was made of Atta or the other three hijackers.

Staff members now are searching documents in the National Archives to look for notes from the meeting in Afghanistan and any other possible references to Atta and Able Danger, Felzenberg said.

Felzenberg sought to minimize the significance of the new information.

''Even if it were valid, it would've joined the lists of dozens of other instances where information was not shared,'' Felzenberg said. ''There was a major problem with intelligence sharing.''

Weldon on Wednesday wrote to Thomas Kean, chairman of the 9/11 commission, and Lee Hamilton, the vice chairman, asking for information to be sought that would look at why the information was not passed on by Pentagon lawyers to the FBI.

His letter also asks the commissioners to find out why the panel's staff members did not pass the information about Able Danger onto commission members and provide full documentation.

Kansas Sen. Pat Roberts, chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, and his House counterpart, Michigan Rep. Peter Hoekstra, are looking into the issue.


This is a chickens*** excuse from above:

The information did not make it into the final report because it was not consistent with what the commission knew about Atta's whereabouts before the attacks, Felzenberg said.

So, if the commission didn't know where Atta was, but the data was there, that would be inconsistant, but SO WHAT!!! (If I wasn't making a six and a half hour drive this afternoon, I'd be dipping into my stock of Jack Daniel's.)
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24thcenstfan
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Something Wicked This Fae Comes
Makes you wonder what else the 9/11 Commission conveniently left out of the report. :ermm:
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ImpulseEngine
Admiral
Wichita,

I completely agree with everything that you said.


AB,

They knew about it and just left it out...? :jawdrop:
@&^#*!!! The matter is too important for these "games". :angry:
Hey, if you're not going to be using that stock of Jack Daniel's... :D
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Admiralbill_gomec
UberAdmiral
Quote:
 
Makes you wonder what else the 9/11 Commission conveniently left out of the report.



Funny you should mention that, 24...

http://www.nationalreview.com/mccarthy/mcc...00404190849.asp

Titled: The Wall Truth
Subtitled: Gorelick provides the clearest proof yet that she should resign.



The grandstanding Richard Clarke having made apologies all the rage, one should expect that President Bush and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice will be getting one in the next day or two. Something like this:

Dear Mr. President and Dr. Rice:
Very sorry about all that high dudgeon a couple of weeks ago. You remember, when we couldn't pass a microphone, a pencil, or a camera without perorations about the vital need to have the President waive executive privilege and ignore scads of history so Dr. Rice could be permitted to testify under oath and publicly (and improve our Nielson numbers) to address provocative allegations by another commission fave — er, witness — Richard Clarke. Turns out we should have mentioned that if Condi had just zipped an op-ed over to the Washington Post that would have done the trick. We regret any inconvenience to you, your staff, or the Constitution.
Respectfully, the 9/11 Commissioners
.

If that note is not forthcoming, then someone's got some explaining to do about "The Truth About 'the Wall,'" Jamie Gorelick's remarkable Washington Post op-ed from Sunday, which purports to put to rest the nettlesome squawking about her untenable position as a commissioner judging the causes of pre-9/11 intelligence failure, a matter in which she was a key participant. Leaving aside, for a moment, how off-the-wall her account of the wall is, the fact that she well knows she needed to say something is the clearest indication yet that she belongs in the witness chair, not on the commissioners' bench.

Gorelick's op-ed intentionally raises five different points in her purported defense. Around them are sandwiched two others — opening and closing salvos that she can't resist mentioning but avoids identifying as argument points because she is too smart not to know that they scream out for her recusal. I'll take them in the order in which she makes them.

1. Ashcroft is wrong. Gorelick starts by asserting that Attorney General John Ashcroft gave testimony that was "simply not true" when he claimed both that "the single greatest structural cause for September 11 was the wall that segregated criminal investigators and intelligence agents[,]" and that Gorelick "built that wall through a March 1995 memo." In fact, Ashcroft's testimony was entirely true: The wall was a policy that virtually guaranteed intelligence failure, and the March 1995 memo was its first building block, a harbinger of the further institutionalizing of the wall that would come, from Gorelick, only a few months later. That, however, is beside the point.

When witnesses give differing accounts, it is left to an impartial arbiter — not one of the witnesses — to sort it out. Moreover, the commission's standard, announced to maximum preening effect only three weeks ago after Clarke's testimony spawned demands for Rice's testimony, is that essential witnesses, and particularly those who are in a position to clarify or refute the testimony of prior essential witnesses (i.e., the position Rice was in vis-à-vis Clarke), must testify under oath and in public. Not surprisingly, while brazenly accusing the attorney general of the United States of giving false testimony, Gorelick elides mention of the Clarke/Rice dust-up. But it did happen, and Gorelick was gleefully in the thick of it. Why is what's sauce for the goose not sauce for the commissioner?

2. "I did not invent the "wall," which is not a wall but a set of procedures implementing a 1978 statute (the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or FISA) and federal court decisions interpreting it." Gorelick did invent the wall. The wall was not a set of procedures implementing FISA as construed by federal decisional law. To quote Gorelick's 1995 memorandum (something she carefully avoids doing), the procedures her memorandum put in place "go beyond what is legally required...[to] prevent any risk of creating an unwarranted appearance that FISA is being used to avoid procedural safeguards which would apply in a criminal investigation." (Emphasis added.) As this rather straightforward English sentence illuminates, the wall exceeded the requirements of FISA and then-existing federal case law.

What the wall implemented was not the FISA statute as construed by the courts but rather Gorelick's overheated view of what would be useful to avoid being accused of misusing FISA. To be sure, it is often prudent for the government to hamstring itself beyond legal requirements; going-the-extra-mile improves the (already good) chances that courts will reject motions by defendants to suppress damaging evidence (like incriminating recorded conversations). It is, however, irresponsible for the government to hamstring itself when that means national security will be imperiled — which is what happens when agents are forbidden from communicating with one another.

3. The prohibition on prosecutors directing intelligence investigations was in effect long before the 1995 guidelines issued by the Reno Justice Department. This is transparent misdirection. The government usually collects evidence of ordinary crimes under the criminal law, not FISA; but there is nothing inherently wrong with collecting evidence of ordinary crimes under FISA. The error that was made during the 1980s was FISA's certification requirement (which merely called for a representation that the government was seeking FISA-interception authority for the purpose of collecting national-security intelligence) was read as if it limited the government's ability to use FISA-derived evidence in ordinary criminal cases. The federal courts compounded this error by fashioning a "primary purpose" test which required the government, before it could use FISA evidence in a criminal case, to prove that it had been motivated to use FISA by national-security concerns — i.e., that it hadn't used FISA as a pretext to conduct what was really a criminal investigation.

This was the state of play in 1995, when the Reno Justice Department — with Gorelick pulling the laboring oar — instituted the wall. Gorelick may be correct — we'd have to hear her testify subject to cross-examination to be sure — when she declares that "[t]he point [of the Reno guidelines] was to preserve the ability of prosecutors to use information collected by intelligence agents." (My own sense, for what little it may be worth, is that the point was to mollify civil-liberties activists and conspiracy theorists who trumped up baseless fears that the government would dishonestly use FISA authority to investigate people who were not national-security risks — but I am not the person who wrote the guidelines, and we should probably give her the benefit of the doubt regarding her intentions. But good intentions hardly mean the actions they spawn will be sound.)

The wall generally forbidding intelligence agents from communicating with their criminal counterparts was a suicidally excessive way to ensure that what little information intelligence agents were permitted to pass would be admissible in court. This is the product of a mindset that insists, beyond all reason and common sense, that terrorism is just a law-enforcement problem. The object of a rational counterterrorism approach is to prevent mass murder from happening in the first place, not to improve your litigating posture for the indictment you return after thousands of people have been slaughtered.

4. The Ashcroft Justice Department failed to dismantle the wall prior to the 9/11 attacks. Yes, that's true. And it was dumb, which was why Ashcroft got grilled over it by Gorelick's fellow commissioners. But Gorelick's argument actually makes my point. If it was relevant, probative and highly material for the commission to probe why Ashcroft did not eradicate the wall when he had the chance in the months before 9/11, it is doubly relevant, probative, and highly material to probe why on earth Gorelick erected the wall in the first place.

5. Gorelick's March 1995 memo concerned only two cases and permitted "freer coordination between intelligence and criminal investigators than was subsequently permitted by the 1995 guidelines" and the Ashcroft Justice Department. So what? The fact is that Gorelick's 1995 memo was excessively prohibitive. Who cares if it was somewhat less excessively prohibitive than the July 1995 guidelines — especially given that Gorelick was responsible for the 1995 guidelines (that were reaffirmed in 2001). If Gorelick is looking for a medal because she was, at least as she sees it, marginally less irresponsible in March 1995 than she was in July 1995, she should not hold her breath.

And her hyperventilating about acting to protect the two cases (including mine) from the threat of having convictions reversed is specious. By the time she penned her March 1995 memo, the first World Trade Center bombing prosecution had been over for a year and my case was in its third month of trial. The only conceivable threat to eventual convictions would have been (a) if the prosecutors and agents in my case had learned information about defense strategy by virtue of the government's continuing investigation of some of our indicted defendants for possible new crimes; or (b) if the continuing investigation had turned up exculpatory information about the defendants in my case and I had not been told about it so I could disclose it. Far from being unique to national-security matters, that situation is a commonplace when the government deals with violent organizations (which tend to obstruct justice and routinely plot to kill or influence witnesses, prosecutors, and/or jurors, thus requiring continuing investigations even as already indicted cases proceed).

To avoid constitutional problems in such a situation, the government regularly assigns a prosecutor and agent who are not involved in the already indicted case to vet information from the continuing investigation before it is permitted to be communicated to agents and prosecutors on the indicted case. This way, the team on the indicted case learns only what it is allowed to know (viz., evidence of new crimes the defendants have committed), but not what it should not know (viz., defense strategy information and incriminating admissions about the indicted case made without the consent of counsel); and the government maintains the ability to reveal any exculpatory information (as federal law requires). As Gorelick's 1995 memorandum recounts, the U.S. attorney in the Southern District of New York had already made sure that was done in my case long before Gorelick's memo. There was no need for Gorelick to do more; what she did served only to place additional, unnecessary barriers to information sharing which — her memo, again, acknowledges — were not required by existing law.

6. The July 1995 guidelines — the wall — did not really prevent information sharing and merely implemented court decisions. The guidelines did prevent information sharing — that was their purpose. They literally permitted some information to be passed over the wall if intelligence agents realized that evidence they'd developed might prove the commission of a serious crime. Intelligence agents, however, were hardly in a position to come to such a realization with any confidence because the wall generally forbade them from coordinating with criminal agents. Thus, they were ill equipped to recognize the significance of information to which they were privy.

More importantly, the hyper-technical 1995 guidelines were so byzantine as to be inscrutable for non-lawyer agents in the field, who found it far easier to assume they weren't allowed to communicate with one another than to venture into Gorelick's labyrinth without benefit of Ariadne's golden cord. That is why, for example, the FBI's criminal division declined to assist its intelligence division in August 2001, when an astute agent was frantically trying to find Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, the eventual suicide hijackers who steered Flight 77 into the Pentagon. Whether or not the wall procedures dictated that decision, the culture of dysfunction the procedures had fostered was by then firmly entrenched.

7. The relevant history regarding the wall is well known, Gorelick has recused herself from consideration of her own actions and those of the Justice Department while she was there, and her fellow commissioners have spoken up in her defense. This is offered as Gorelick's wind-up. If it is adopted as the new standard, the commission should stop wasting everyone's time and money right now. First, the relevant history of many aspects of the 9/11 investigation is extensively well documented; yet, the commission has insisted on calling witnesses — despite the fact that our nation is at war and many of the witnesses have been taken away from their wartime responsibilities for hours (and sometimes days) to comply with commission requests for information and testimony. To this point, no witness has been permitted to get away with a curt "you don't need me — you've already got enough information."

Second, Gorelick's conflict is not so tidy as to be solved by avoiding inquiry into her time in the Justice Department. If that were the case, John Ashcroft could have been a commissioner — and just imagine the howling if someone had proposed that. Gorelick's conflict, central to the matter of intelligence lapse, goes to the heart of the commission's investigation. Whenever she asks a question on another subject — even if she does it in good faith — the public is entitled to wonder whether she is trying to shift blame or scrutiny away from herself. The legitimacy of the commission is thus critically undermined.

Finally, the support of Gorelick's fellow commissioners is irrelevant. Again, these are the same guys who were screaming for Rice three weeks ago, for no better reason than that Clarke had made allegations Rice was in a position to shed light on. Ashcroft has now made assertions far more central to the salient matter of institutional impediments to information sharing. That those same commissioners are not being consistent, that they are not calling for Gorelick to step down and be sworn as a witness, is inexplicable. I'm sure they have all bonded; I'm quite certain they admire and respect Gorelick's powerful mind and exemplary work ethic — they'd be foolish not to. But imagine for a moment that Gorelick had not been appointed to serve on the commission. Is there anyone on the planet who doesn't think she'd have been subpoenaed to testify after her memorandum came to light during last week's proceedings? Is there anyone who thinks she could have avoided testifying under such circumstances by writing an op-ed?

Gorelick's "defense" merely underscores how inappropriate it is for her to sit in judgment as a commissioner. Obviously, she's hell-bent on staying. And so we watch as the commission slowly mutates from a potentially useful exercise, to a politicized teledrama, to a hopelessly suspect irrelevancy.

— Andrew C. McCarthy, a former chief assistant U.S. attorney who led the 1995 terrorism prosecution against Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman and eleven others, is an NRO contributor.
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Admiralbill_gomec
UberAdmiral
ImpulseEngine
Aug 12 2005, 10:36 AM
Wichita,

I completely agree with everything that you said.


AB,

They knew about it and just left it out...?  :jawdrop: 
@&^#*!!!  The matter is too important for these "games".  :angry: 
Hey, if you're not going to be using that stock of Jack Daniel's...    :D

The more I read, the more I think the 9/11 Commission was a joke.

(Sorry, but we're taking part of the Jack Daniel's with us!)
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who
Have light saber. Will travel.
Wichita
Aug 12 2005, 06:43 AM
This report highlights the problem with having Jamie Gorelick on the panel. There is nothing inherently wrong with her nor with the fact that she was a high ranking Clinton Administration official.

The problem was she was a high ranking official who wrote the policy that affected the sharing of intel. How can you adequately investigate the problems with intel if you assume from the beginning that one part of the procedure is above investigation? How can you investigate that procedure if you assume from the beginning that there was no way it contributed to the problem?

IMO it was quite possible that, after an adequate investigation of Gorelick's role in the issue, the commission may have come to the conclusion that it played no role in the issue. NOT INVESTIGATING it, however, calls into question the integrity of the whole report.

Now, Commission members are saying that they did hear this information - why they did nothing in response calls into greater question their report.

IE, I agree that the mindset of the time was entirely different and that neither Clinton and Bush should not have been expected to believe random reports of this possibility.

That is very different, however, from the issue of this particular set of administrative procedures. It is quite possible that this set of administrative procedures made it impossible (with the force of law) to share information. If they were formulated by the Clinton Administration, then they should be the responsibility of the Clinton Administration - just as administrative procedures formulated by the Bush administration should be the responsibility of the Bush administration.

Thousands of these types of regulations are passed yearly with little input from the public, but have the potential to impact the public greatly. It is a serious concern, but seldom gets publicly.

This particular decision by Gorelick was incredibly harmful and stupid IMO and while I don't think it rises to the criminal level, I find it offensive that she didn't even have to answer questions about it because of her position on the Commission.

BTW, this whole question is now being linked to the Sandy Berger situation. People have wondered why he would do what he did ,,, this may be why. We'll have to see ...

This all seems strange in that I am just hearing it in the news and there is little reporting about it.

Was Sandy Berger the high ranking Clinton official that was stealing and destroying documents? Who was Berger?

Did Clinton know about this, decide not to investigate, and then tried to cover it up by having Sandy Berger steal and destroy dococuments?

There is so little information that it is hard to discuss. If this is true it presents an even darker cloud over Clinton and may even affect his wife.
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